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Editors' Summary 
THE BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic  Activity  held its sixty-fifth confer- 
ence  in Washington,  D.C.,  on March 26  and 27,  1998.  This  issue  of 
Brookings  Papers  includes  the papers,  reports,  and discussions  pre- 
sented  at the conference.  The  first paper analyses  the causes  and the 
treatment of the recent financial crisis in East Asia,  focusing  in partic- 
ular on  the  International Monetary  Fund's  interventions,  in  order to 
develop  guidelines  for  new  international  workout  arrangements that 
would  prevent  or swiftly  resolve  future financial  crises.  The  second 
presents a new model of saving over the life cycle  and uses it to examine 
the effect  of instruments that commit  savers,  such as defined contribu- 
tion pension plans with penalties for early withdrawal. The third paper 
challenges  the notion that deficit-reducing reforms are politically  costly, 
and relates the "success"  of such programs to the composition  of the 
fiscal  changes.  Using  household  survey  data,  the  first report depicts 
patterns of  wealth holding  and wealth  accumulation  among American 
families  since the mid- 1980s,  analyzing  the roles of different forms of 
saving in the accumulation of wealth.  The concluding  report examines 
the effects of hours reductions on employment and wages,  and considers 
the  motivation  behind  pressure  for  work-sharing  arrangements  in 
Germany. 
THE  EAST  ASIAN  financial crisis  struck the economies  of the region 
and the world  financial community  with  little  warning and surprising 
force.  It focused  international  scrutiny  on long-standing  flaws  in the 
financial,  corporate,  and government  institutions  of the affected  coun- 
tries.  The  International  Monetary  Fund (IMF)  assigned  much  of  the 
responsibility  for the crisis to these institutional shortcomings and made 
their overhaul  a central  aim  of  its  rescue  efforts.  It also  insisted  on 
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fiscal contraction and higher interest rates in the countries that applied 
for emergency  loans.  These  steps  were prescribed as a way to restore 
confidence  and head off  excessive  devaluation,  but financial  markets 
did not respond favorably  and, after the IMF's  original  interventions, 
the crisis deepened in countries throughout the region.  In the first paper 
of the present volume,  Steven  Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs provide their 
own analysis  of the crisis,  questioning  the diagnosis  and prescriptions 
of  the IMF.  While  they  fully  acknowledge  the  shortcomings  of  East 
Asian  capitalism  that  the  IMF  and  others  have  identified,  they  see 
intrinsic instability  of international financial markets as the key cause 
of  the  crisis.  They  also  offer  suggestions  for  handling  the  ongoing 
problems  in the region  and prescribe measures  that would  reduce the 
risk of future crises  in the region or elsewhere. 
The  authors review  several  historical  instances  of  crises  involving 
developing  countries  and find that they share certain common  charac- 
teristics.  In each  case,  economies  were  buffeted  by  sudden  shifts  in 
financial flows; the shifts were, to some extent,  unanticipated; and they 
provoked  deep  recessions  in the debtor countries  and losses  to inter- 
national investors.  Analysts  have typically  explained  such crises as the 
consequence  of fundamental changes:  either changes  in world market 
conditions  that affected  the ability  of borrowers to repay debts or de- 
velopments  in the debtor country that led creditors to reassess the riski- 
ness  of  lending  to  it.  But  the  authors argue that neither  explanation 
applied in the summer of  1997.  International conditions  were benign, 
and no fundamental imbalances  emerged in the East Asian economies, 
where  real  exchange  rates  were  only  mildly  overvalued  and overall 
debt-carrying capacities  presented no imminent risks of default. 
The idea that a financial crisis  might arise from intrinsic instability 
in  lending,  even  without  a  deterioration  of  fundamentals,  has  been 
considered  by the authors and other analysts in connection  with earlier 
crises.  In this paper, Radelet and Sachs start their discussion  of the idea 
by distinguishing  between  illiquidity  and insolvency.  An illiquid  bor- 
rower lacks ready cash to service  debts but has the net worth to repay 
debts  in  the  long  run.  An  insolvent  borrower lacks  the net  worth to 
repay debts out of future earnings.  Illiquidity  gives  rise to a financial 
crisis  when the capital market will  not provide fresh loans to an other- 
wise solvent borrower. That occurs when no individual creditor is will- 
ing  to  extend  a  loan  if  other  creditors  do  not  lend  as  well.  Absent William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xi 
collective  action,  and fearing that others will  call in their claims,  indi- 
vidual  lenders have an incentive  to get their money  out,  thus produc- 
ing a self-fulfilling  financial crisis.  This  idea is closely  related to the 
Diamond-Dybvig  model of bank runs, which occur when a large number 
of  individual  depositors  withdraw  their money  at the  same  time  not 
because  they coincidentally  all need  it at once,  but because  each one 
fears  that the  others  will  withdraw  funds  and knows  that the  bank, 
though solvent,  cannot immediately  pay off  all depositors.  In the case 
of  international lending  in dollars,  the panic  arises from the fear that 
there are insufficient  reserves  to pay off  all short-term dollar claims. 
Because  a liquidity  crisis  itself  may  lead  to bankruptcies  and forced 
liquidations,  in the end it may be hard to distinguish  from a problem 
that originated with fundamentals. 
Turning to the specifics  of  the East Asian  economies,  Radelet  and 
Sachs evaluate  the potential  importance of deteriorating fundamentals 
as an explanation  of the crisis.  They identify  some  specific  problems. 
Growing competition  from China and Mexico  weakened particular ex- 
port sectors  in East Asia,  and contributed to the slowdown  in export 
growth  from  Thailand,  Korea,  and Malaysia  after  1995.  The  sharp 
appreciation of the dollar relative  to the yen  and European currencies 
pushed  down  the dollar  prices  of  many  exports  from the region  and 
raised the real burden of  debt service  for East Asian  borrowers.  But 
they also  observe  that international conditions  more broadly were fa- 
vorable,  with Europe and the United  States expanding,  inflation low, 
and interest rates stable.  On balance,  they reason that internationally 
generated problems cannot explain much of what happened to the East 
Asian  economies. 
The authors acknowledge  that haphazard financial liberalization,  to- 
gether with pegged  exchange  rates,  contributed to financial weakness 
and left  the Asian  economies  exposed  to financial market instability. 
Banks and finance companies  were unsophisticated,  with little experi- 
ence in asset management and with inadequate supervision.  Investment 
funds were misallocated  and financial institutions ended up with exces- 
sive currency exposure and maturity mismatches.  However,  the authors 
reject these  factors  as sufficient  explanations  for the crisis,  reasoning 
that if  they  had been  important,  financial  markets themselves  would 
have perceived  rising risks.  In fact,  yield  spreads on Asian  debt were 
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high  levels  right  up  to  the  brink  of  the  crisis.  They  also  note  that 
instances  of  internal mismanagement  varied from country to country, 
as did boom-bust cycles  in some of the stock and real estate markets of 
the region,  making such problems unlikely candidates to explain a crisis 
that hit several countries in the region simultaneously. 
Radelet and Sachs use a probit model to test formally their preferred 
hypothesis-that  the crisis was triggered by dramatic swings in creditor 
expectations  about the behavior of other creditors-against  alternative 
explanations  relying  on  global  or national  changes  in  fundamentals. 
They  use  panel  data for twenty-two  emerging  markets over  1994-97 
and predict the onset of a financial crisis with a vector of economic  and 
institutional variables.  Their panel contains nine instances  of financial 
crisis,  defined  as a sharp shift from capital  inflow  to capital outflow. 
The variables  tested  as predictors of  crisis  are the ratio of  short-term 
debt to reserves,  the lagged change in the ratio of private credit to GDP, 
the ratio of capital inflows  to GDP,  the ratio of the current account to 
GDP, the ratio of total foreign debt to reserves,  the lagged real exchange 
rate change,  and  a  comparative  index  of  corruption.  Using  various 
specifications  of their equation,  the authors find that only the first three 
of these variables are significantly  associated  with a crisis.  These all fit 
their idea that financial instability  is the key,  indicating,  respectively, 
the  importance  of  limited  capacity  to  pay  off  foreign  creditors,  an 
extended  and thus fragile banking system,  and a vulnerability  to sharp 
reversal of capital flows.  The other variables,  which they reason could 
signal problems of solvency  or other fundamentals that might precipi- 
tate a crisis,  either have the wrong sign or are insignificant. 
Radelet and Sachs are critical of the IMF's response to the countries' 
crises once they were recognized.  Between August and December  1997, 
the IMF signed emergency  lending agreements with Thailand, Indone- 
sia,  and Korea,  promising  financial support conditional  on various re- 
forms.  The reforms included macroeconomic  measures of fiscal tight- 
ening,  higher interest rates,  and restrictive domestic  credit,  as well  as 
measures to dramatically restructure the financial system and deal with 
other aspects  of  the domestic  economic  system.  The authors describe 
how  the individual  countries  reacted to these  requirements and docu- 
ment that the programs failed  to restore financial confidence,  stabilize 
exchange  rates,  or support domestic  economic  activity.  They  also de- 
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the  management  of  the crisis  changed.  The  previous  fiscal  restraints 
were relaxed and foreign debt problems were addressed directly rather 
than by trying to restore the confidence  of foreign  investors. 
With an eye  to designing  programs to help the East Asian  nations, 
and to help with problems that might arise elsewhere  in the future, the 
authors assess  what went wrong with the IMF's  efforts  in 1997.  They 
offer several reasons why these failed to reestablish market confidence 
in  time  to  prevent  a  collapse  of  debt  servicing  or  to  achieve  early 
stabilization  of  exchange  rates.  First,  since  its  arrival signals  that a 
problem is serious,  they see the IMF as inevitably  disadvantaged in its 
attempts to  rally  market confidence  in  the  short term.  Second,  they 
believe  that the IMF added to market concerns by declaring at the start 
that the financial crisis stemmed from fundamental weaknesses,  and not 
from a self-fulfilling  panic among creditors.  Third, they question  the 
basic  IMF  approach to  restoring  confidence,  which  relied  on  tough 
restructuring of countries'  financial markets through bank closings  and 
tighter regulation.  Far from convincing  creditors to roll over short-term 
claims,  the realization that banks would not be bailed out incited panic. 
Fourth,  the  authors question  the  contractionary  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies  in the IMF programs.  They  note  that the initial  measures  of 
fiscal  tightening,  which  aimed to achieve  surpluses in the face  of  the 
severe  contractionary effects  of the crisis  itself,  were justified  as con- 
fidence  builders  that would  help  to  stabilize  currencies.  But  foreign 
exchange  markets neither reacted favorably when these measures were 
imposed  nor reacted  adversely  when  the fiscal  targets were  eased  in 
early 1998.  And they argue that tighter monetary policy,  which would 
strengthen  a country's  exchange  rate in  normal  circumstances,  may 
have the opposite  effect  in financial panics by draining liquidity  from 
the domestic  economy,  weakening  business  borrowers,  and adding to 
the stresses  on the banking system.  Fifth,  the authors reason that the 
uncertain nature of the IMF loan packages compromised  whatever con- 
fidence  they  might otherwise  have  given  lenders.  They  calculate  that 
out of total announced loan commitments  of $114 billion to Indonesia, 
Korea,  and Thailand,  only  $23  billion  had been disbursed by the end 
of  1997,  and only  $35  billion  had  been  disbursed  through  the  first 
quarter of  1998.  Indonesia  alone  had received  only  $3  billion  of  the 
$40 billion  committed. 
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need to be addressed. They urge that the IMF and Asian countries insist 
on debt restructurings as the way to meet short-term claims coming due 
in the future,  conserving  IMF funds to facilitate  badly needed  adjust- 
ments in the domestic  economy.  Because  a large part of the net worth 
of  domestic  banks has been  wiped  out by currency  depreciation  and 
many banks are unable to obtain new funds through conventional  chan- 
nels,  Asian firms that rely on these banks for trade credits face a sharp 
squeeze.  For the immediate future, the authors suggest  using a portion 
of IMF loans to help finance the working capital needs of these export- 
ers.  For the medium  run, they  suggest  using  such funds  to establish 
deposit  insurance programs and to help to recapitalize  banks in prepa- 
ration for  selling  them to private investors.  The  authors also  believe 
that once  market confidence  is restored by debt rescheduling  and other 
steps that put banks on a firmer footing,  some part of IMF funds could 
usefully  be deployed  to nudge up interest rates. 
Turning to the systemic  questions raised by recent crises in East Asia 
and elsewhere,  the  authors argue that current arrangements for  inte- 
grating emerging economies  into the global financial system are clearly 
defective.  They note that, frequently,  capital market liberalizations  in 
Latin America,  eastern Europe, and Asia have been followed  by finan- 
cial crises  and deep economic  dislocations.  Moreover,  the emergency 
bailout programs for Mexico,  Argentina,  and East Asia have arguably 
contributed to new moral hazards in international lending.  In light of 
their conclusion  that international financial markets are inherently un- 
stable,  at least  for countries  borrowing  heavily  from  abroad at short 
maturities,  the  authors see  the push  to fully  open  capital  markets in 
developing  countries as misguided.  Short-term borrowing is useful for 
financing trade flows but inappropriate for longer term investments  and 
adds to  currency risks  of  highly  leveraged  financial  institutions.  The 
authors believe  that policy  should support long-term capital flows,  es- 
pecially  direct investment,  and aim to confine short-term international 
flows  mainly to short-term trade transactions.  They also urge that for- 
eign banks be allowed to operate in developing  countries, because their 
presence  would have a stabilizing  effect. 
Should panics threaten in the future, Radelet and Sachs urge a policy 
approach  that relies  on  orderly  workout  arrangements  for  troubled 
loans,  rather than IMF bailouts,  which  have proved ineffective  in the 
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that of  chapter  11-style  bankruptcy workouts  in  the  United  States. 
These  mechanisms  would  provide  a framework  for  negotiations  be- 
tween creditors and debtors to overcome  the collective  action problems 
which  the authors find at the center of  financial crises.  They  suggest 
that a resolution  of these  problems  would  involve  a standstill  on debt 
servicing,  debt  for  equity  swaps,  and ways  to  give  debtor countries 
access  to capital markets by granting repayment priority to new loans. 
Creating  such  a framework  and integrating  it  with  bankruptcy laws 
within each country would  be a complex  task,  but the authors believe 
that policymakers  must  tackle  it.  However,  they  hope  that limits  on 
short-term capital  flows  would  make the need  for  such  interventions 
less  likely. 
EcONOMISTS  USUALLY  ASSUME  that the intentions  and actions  of 
agents are perfectly  aligned.  But it is a rare individual who is not aware 
of everyday  situations  where there is a gap between  intention and ac- 
tion.  Surveys suggest that such gaps are systematic,  and in some cases, 
involve  behavior  of  economic  significance.  For example,  in  a  1997 
survey  by  Public  Agenda,  three-quarters of  the respondents  believed 
that they should be saving  more for retirement; a variety of other sur- 
veys  have also found a substantial gap between  households'  estimates 
of  what  they  should  save  and  what  they  actually  are  saving.  Such 
systematic,  self-acknowledged  error not only  contradicts the standard 
economic  model of the maximizing  consumer,  but may help to explain 
the prevalence  of households  with negligible  net worth and seemingly 
uneconomic  use of credit card debt. 
A discrepancy between intentions for the long run and current actions 
may not simply represent a desire for instantaneous gratification.  Con- 
sumers may be discouraged  from saving by an awareness that today's 
saving will be consumed long before they reach retirement. In this case, 
they might actually prefer forms of saving that are committed for long 
periods,  so that the savings are invulnerable to premature future spend- 
ing impulses.  In the second paper of this issue,  David Laibson,  Andrea 
Repetto,  and Jeremy Tobacman  explore  the implications  of  a model 
from the psychology  literature that makes  explicit  a systematic  time 
inconsistency  in intertemporal decisions.  Modifying  the standard life- 
cycle  model of consumption  to incorporate such behavior,  they explore 
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importance of commitment features in saving plans as an aid to increas- 
ing national saving  and consumer welfare. 
The  conflict  between  a  consumer's  desire  for,  on  the  one  hand, 
instantaneous  gratification when trading off  today and tomorrow,  and 
on the other, patience when contemplating  intertemporal trade-offs  far 
in the future,  can be captured by assuming  an instantaneous  discount 
rate,  or rate of  time  preference,  that declines  as the trade-off  moves 
further away from the present. In this case,  the implied discount func- 
tion,  which  assigns  a present  value  to  future  utilities,  declines  at a 
steeper rate in the short run than in the long  run. This  contrasts with 
the standard assumption  of  a constant  discount  rate,  which  implies  a 
discount  function  that declines  at a constant  exponential  rate.  A dis- 
count rate that varies according to how far it is from the present leads 
to time-inconsistent  behavior.  For example,  a twenty-year-old  individ- 
ual with such preferences  might discount  utility from next year's  con- 
sumption at 20 percent,  while regarding consumption  at ages forty and 
forty-one as roughly equivalent-discounting  utility from consumption 
at age forty-one  by,  say,  an extra 2 percent.  But when this individual 
is forty,  impatience  will  lead him to discount  what is then next year's 
utility by 20 percent. 
Is a consumer  aware today that he will  feel  quite differently  about 
future trade-offs  when they are closer  in time? In making plans,  does 
he take into account that his future self will not follow  a plan that would 
be optimal  from today's  perspective?  Consumers who  are unaware of 
their own  time-inconsistency  are "naifs,"  constantly  modifying  their 
consumption plans, even in the absence of unexpected shocks to income 
or interest rates, but not taking their future, inconsistent,  behavior into 
account.  Self-aware consumers,  by contrast, take the behavior of future 
selves  into account,  and in the absence  of  shocks,  early selves  would 
not be surprised by the consumption  path that unfolds. 
Self-awareness  raises a range of interesting issues  of self-regulation 
with intrapersonal strategic characteristics.  Early selves  would  like to 
commit  later selves  to honor the preferences  of those early selves,  but 
later selves  will do their best to maximize their own interests when their 
time comes.  Self-aware  individuals  recognize  that the savings  they set 
aside today for retirement may be impatiently consumed  before retire- 
ment.  Whether this leads them to increase or decrease  saving  today is 
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as they would if they could prevent such premature consumption  in the 
future,  or it may  lead them to increase  saving  to compensate  for the 
premature consumption  prior to  retirement.  Self-awareness  will  also 
lead  consumers  to  seek  out  forms  of  saving  that cannot  be  tapped 
prematurely.  In  their  analysis,  the  authors  assume  that  consumers, 
although they exhibit  time-inconsistent  behavior,  are self-aware  indi- 
viduals  rather than  naifs.  And  they  assume,  though  recognizing  its 
artificiality,  that time-inconsistent  consumers,  like  exponential  con- 
sumers, have the virtually unlimited sophistication  required to perform 
the complex  backwards induction involved  in optimization. 
To explore the implications  of time-inconsistent  consumers both for 
individual life-cycle  behavior and for the importance of the commitment 
elements  in  saving  plans  such  as Individual  Retirement  Accounts 
(IRAs),  the authors simulate an overlapping generations model in which 
the typical consumer maximizes  expected  discounted utility,  subject to 
a lifetime  budget  constraint.  They  incorporate the  idea  of  near-term 
impatience  with a computationally  tractable discount  function,  which 
they call  quasi-hyperbolic.  This  discount  function  is exponential,  ex- 
cept that for all periods after the present, utilities  are scaled down by a 
constant factor. This makes the discount between this year and the next 
much greater than the discount between  any two adjacent years in the 
future. Thus the current period receives  greater weight relative to every 
future period than in the standard exponential  function.  The rest of the 
specification  of  preference  is  standard. The utility  of  consumption  in 
any period is given  by a "felicity"  function  that implies  constant rel- 
ative risk aversion,  and further weighted  by the probability of survival 
to that period. The authors consider two parameter values in this func- 
tion,  corresponding  to low  and high risk aversion of consumers. 
For their simulations,  the authors take great effort  to use  realistic 
assumptions  about  the  stochastic  processes  describing  income,  be- 
quests, and mortality-processes  central to household consumption and 
saving decisions.  Individuals enter economic  life at age twenty,  and are 
assigned  survival rates given  in ordinary life  tables but constrained to 
live a maximum of ninety years. Further, individuals are divided among 
three educational categories-no  high school  diploma,  high school  di- 
ploma, and college  degree-with  approximate population weights from 
the Michigan  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID).  Income  in- 
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dent children,  supplemental  security income,  workers'  compensation, 
and unemployment  insurance,  but  excludes  asset  income.  For  each 
educational category,  the authors use PSID data to estimate an income 
process,  taking  into  account  family  size,  age,  cohort,  and regional 
unemployment.  The panel structure of the PSID is used to estimate the 
stochastic  component  of  nonasset  income  for  the  typical  household, 
with different  processes  for pre- and postretirement  income.  The  au- 
thors also  use  the  PSID  to  model  realistically  the process  governing 
bequests.  And  they  assume  a progressive  tax  structure that approxi- 
mates  1997  tax law.  In performing  the simulations,  households  from 
each educational  group are assigned  a fixed family  size  and the mean 
retirement age for their educational group. Aggregate unemployment is 
assumed constant.  Although  fixing  household  size  and retirement age 
greatly simplifies  the analysis,  it prevents examination of how different 
stages of the life cycle-such  as marriage, birth of children, and paying 
for college-affect  saving decisions,  and how the choice  of retirement 
age responds to shocks  to income  or wealth. 
How does the saving behavior of time-inconsistent  consumers differ 
from saving behavior under the standard assumptions,  and what differ- 
ence do such preferences  make to aggregate saving? One might expect 
that time-inconsistent  consumers would save less during working years 
and would  be  more likely  to be  liquidity  constrained.  To  make such 
differences  concrete,  the  authors compare  simulations  of  the  saving 
behavior of consumers with quasi-hyperbolic  preferences and standard 
preferences,  calibrating their preference  parameters to fit general fea- 
tures of saving behavior.  For each educational group and each assump- 
tion about the level  of risk aversion,  the authors choose  a rate of time 
preference  to  replicate  the  median  level  of  preretirement wealth  ob- 
served in 1983. This requires assigning the time-inconsistent  consumers 
lower  long-term  discount rates to offset  the scaling  down in their dis- 
count functions  after the first year.  The discount  rates used for expo- 
nential  consumers  range from 3 percent to almost  9 percent.  For the 
hyperbolic consumers,  with future utilities  scaled down by 15 'percent, 
the  long-term  discount  rates  are lower,  varying  from  slightly  above 
2 percent to 7.5  percent. 
The  simulations  show  that liquidity  (or borrowing)  constraints  are 
very important for both types  of consumers  during the early stages  of 
life,  and are more important the less  educated the household.  The au- William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xix 
thors show that hyperbolic  consumers behave as if their discount rates 
vary  according  to  the  amount of  current saving  they  expect  will  be 
consumed  in the next period.  Thus at low  levels  of wealth,  when they 
are likely to be liquidity constrained in the following  period, hyperbolic 
consumers will behave as though they were less patient than exponential 
consumers.  Low levels  of cash on hand are self-reinforcing,  since they 
increase the chances that any saving today will be consumed by tomor- 
row's  self.  Hence  they  are more  likely  to  be  liquidity  constrained. 
Differences  between  the quasi-hyperbolic  and exponential  consumers 
are much greater for low than for high levels  of risk aversion. With low 
risk aversion,  almost 60 percent of thirty-five-year-old  hyperbolic high 
school dropouts are liquidity constrained; with exponential preferences, 
only about 20 percent of this same group are constrained. 
Young hyperbolic  consumers would save more for the later years of 
life if they had a mechanism to ensure that they would actually receive 
in the future what they  set aside today.  To illustrate this,  the authors 
simulate the behavior of hyperbolic consumers in an economy with both 
a perfect commitment device and a liquid asset. The effects  are striking. 
On average,  those  with  a high  school  diploma  and low  risk aversion 
accumulate 62 percent more in preretirement wealth than they do in the 
absence  of perfect commitment.  This reallocation  of resources toward 
later life corresponds to a substantial welfare gain. From the perspective 
of the beginning  of the economic  life  cycle,  it is equivalent  to a one- 
time  increase  of  wealth  equal  to  36  percent  of  consumption  at  age 
twenty.  Later selves  benefit more, since they gain most from the higher 
rates  of  accumulation  early  in  the  life  cycle.  The  effect  of  perfect 
commitment is much smaller for highly risk-averse consumers,  amount- 
ing  to  the equivalent  of  a wealth  increase  of  only  2  percent  of  con- 
sumption at age twenty.  This sensitivity  of results to the degree of risk 
aversion is a feature of all the more realistic  simulations  that follow. 
Having illustrated the potential importance of commitment devices, 
the authors examine the effects of defined contribution plans that feature 
commitment.  They focus  on 401(k)  plans that allow withdrawal before 
age fifty-nine  and a half only  under financial hardship, and even  then 
charge a 10 percent penalty.  The popularity of these plans does  not in 
itself reveal the importance of their commitment features,  since 401(k) 
plans provide  other strong  incentives:  deferral of  taxes,  and usually, 
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a 1997 survey,  81 percent of plans involved  an employer  contribution 
contingent  on the employee  contribution; the most  common  arrange- 
ment, reported for 21 percent of the plans,  was a 50 percent employer 
match of contributions up to 6 percent of income. 
To quantify the importance of different features of this type of saving 
plan, the authors simulate their model while varying the characteristics 
of the plan. They consider four cases,  with an employer match of either 
zero or 50 percent, and an early withdrawal penalty of either 10 percent 
or 50 percent. In all cases,  they cap an individual's  annual contributions 
at $10,000  and also cap the employer's  contributions. Focusing on high 
school  graduates and considering  the most  sensitive  case  of  low  risk 
aversion,  three properties  stand out.  First,  for both  exponential  and 
quasi-hyperbolic  consumers,  most accumulation  occurs  in the defined 
contribution plan,  with tax advantages and employer  matching,  rather 
than in  the  liquid  asset.  Second,  total  accumulation  is  dramatically 
increased  by  making  the  saving  plan  available  to  consumers  prema- 
turely. Third, compared with exponential  consumers,  quasi-hyperbolic 
consumers hold relatively higher levels  of savings in the illiquid defined 
contribution plan, rather than as liquid wealth. 
What  are the  implications  of  such  plans  for  national  saving  and 
wealth  accumulation?  Answering  questions  about aggregate  perfor- 
mance  in an overlapping  generations  model  requires assumptions  not 
only about the life-cycle  incomes  and bequests of representative mem- 
bers of  each educational  group,  but also  about how  incomes  increase 
with successive  age cohorts and how the population grows.  The authors 
assume that the number of births into successive  cohorts increases  by 
1 percent  per year  and that income  and other per capita  magnitudes 
grow at 2 percent a year in each successive  cohort. They assume a small 
open  economy,  so  that the  real  interest  rate can  be  taken  as  fixed, 
independent  of national wealth.  Combined  with the assumption of  an 
inelastic  labor  supply,  this  also  implies  that wage  rates  and earned 
income  do not change  with changes  in saving.  The government  is as- 
sumed  to  maintain a balanced  budget,  with  tax gains  or losses  from 
higher savings  or shifts to tax-deferred plans offset  by changes  in gov- 
ernment expenditures.  And the authors consider only  steady states,  so 
that all  cohorts  face  the  same  set  of  saving  options  throughout their 
lives. 
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greatest with low risk aversion.  In this case,  economies  populated with 
either  exponential  or quasi-hyperbolic  consumers  show  dramatic in- 
creases  in saving,  with the tax incentives  inherent in all of the plans. 
Without  employer  matching  and with  a  10 percent  penalty  for  early 
withdrawal,  the steady-state  aggregate  saving  rate increases  by about 
2.5  percentage points with exponential  consumers  and by more than 3 
percentage points with hyperbolic consumers.  Several other features of 
the simulations  stand out. College  graduates generally benefit the most 
from the defined  contribution  plan,  presumably  because  these  house- 
holds  save the most and gain the most from tax deferral. But although 
households  are made better off as a result of the tax reduction on saving, 
for hyperbolic  consumers,  the commitment  element  of the plan is also 
important.  For  a hyperbolic  high  school  graduate  consumer  aged 
twenty,  the introduction of a defined contribution plan with a 10 percent 
penalty and a 50 percent match increases utility by the same amount as 
a wealth increase  of 70 percent of consumption  at age twenty.  For an 
exponential  consumer,  who  has  no  commitment  gain  to  exploit,  the 
comparable gain is only 22 percent. Hyperbolic consumers benefit more 
from the  plans  than do  exponential  consumers,  and respond  well  to 
higher penalties  for early withdrawal. 
The authors' simulations using more risk-averse consumers produce 
sharply attenuated results,  illustrating the crucial role of this parameter 
in  their  model.  In  this  case,  the  much  smaller  saving  responses  of 
exponential consumers are consistent  with the results of other research- 
ers  who  have  used  this  assumption,  and the  difference  between  the 
behavior of exponential  and hyperbolic consumers is greatly narrowed. 
The authors recognize  that it is unlikely that all households  are either 
exponential  or hyperbolic.  They  therefore consider  an economy  con- 
sisting  of  equal proportions of  the two.  As  before,  they  calibrate the 
preferences  to match preretirement wealth.  But this time,  they assume 
that exponential  and hyperbolic  consumers  have  the  same  long-term 
discount rate, while  the hyperbolic consumers again weigh  the present 
heavily relative to the future by scaling down all future utilities.  Adding 
a defined contribution plan now has a larger differential  effect  on the 
two types  of consumer,  since  hyperbolic  consumers  are no longer  as- 
sumed to have  a lower  long-run discount  rate to compensate  for their 
high  short-term rate. There is a larger difference  in the proportion of 
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ference  in  the  benefits  from  the  introduction  of  plans  that  commit 
savings. 
The  authors are encouraged  by  the  ability  of  their simulations  of 
time-inconsistent  consumers  to replicate  salient  features  of  observed 
behavior.  But they  recognize  that much remains  unknown  about the 
importance of time-inconsistent  behavior.  Their results do suggest  the 
possibility  that early withdrawal penalties  are important determinants 
of  the quantity of  saving,  and that such penalties  may even  be in the 
self-interest  of  consumers.  However,  they  note  that while  there  are 
many instruments with commitment  properties,  very few  are sold ex- 
plicitly  for this purpose.  Do  illiquid  assets  such as housing  fulfill  the 
need for such mechanisms?  Or are withdrawal penalties  an important 
feature of IRAs and other government-sponsored  plans to increase sav- 
ing? While  the authors believe  that defined contribution plans provide 
a rich array of psychologically  appealing features, they urge economists 
to devote  much more effort to understanding their effects. 
Addendum 
The  authors'  model  discussed  above  can be  explained  more  fully 
with  the help  of  some  mathematical  notation.  They  report that a dis- 
count function for events 7  periods away that appears to do a reasonable 
job of capturing the time inconsistency  observed  in human subjects  is 
the  generalized  hyperbola  of  the  form  (1 +  o7)-Y0,  where  oa and  y  are 
preference parameters. 
Since  it is computationally  difficult to solve  a life-cycle  model with 
this  function,  the  authors  use  their  more  tractable  quasi-hyperbolic 
function  that implies  similar behavior.  The quasi-hyperbolic  discount 
function simply takes on values {1, 13b,  182,  183,.  .  .}  in successive 
time periods from the present, where 8 is a constant discount factor and 
0  <  1B  <  1. Thus,  valued  in terms of  tomorrow's  utility,  all utilities 
beyond tomorrow are weighted by a standard exponential function with 
a discount  factor 6.  But the discount  from today to tomorrow will  be 
greater. For example,  when a ,B  of 0.85  is used in the simulations,  the 
discount rate is approximately  15 percentage points in this first period, 
giving  the current period much greater weight  relative to every  future 
period than in the standard exponential  function.  The fact that today's 
and tomorrow's  selves  discount  the utilities  of  subsequent  periods  in 
the  same  way  greatly  simplifies  the  description  of  the  optimal  con- 
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The rest of the specification  of preferences is standard. Optimization 
of lifetime  expected  utility gives  rise to what the authors refer to as the 
generalized Euler equation,  which provides the first order condition for 
a current saving decision.  In the standard exponential  model,  the Euler 
equation simply  says that consumers  save up to a level  where the mar- 
ginal  utility  of  forgone  consumption  today  equals  the  appropriately 
discounted  expected  marginal utility of the extra consumption  thereby 
available  tomorrow.  Ignoring the risk of death, the equation is 
u'(Ct)  =  Et[Rbu'(Ct+  )], 
where u denotes utility, C is consumption,  E is the expectations  operator 
at time  t,  and R is  the gross  rate of  return on  savings.  The  fact  that 
some  of  today's  saving  may  actually  be  consumed  in  periods  after 
tomorrow  does  not  need  to  show  up directly  in  the  equation,  since 
tomorrow the consumer will optimize with the same preferences,  saving 
to  a level  that equates  the  expected  marginal utility  of  consumption 
beyond tomorrow to the marginal utility of consumption  tomorrow.  In 
the presence of borrowing constraints,  the Euler condition becomes  an 
inequality,  holding  with equality only  if saving  is positive. 
The  situation  is  quite  different  for  a  self-aware  time-inconsistent 
consumer.  Today's  self knows  that tomorrow's  self has different pref- 
erences  than he  for periods  beyond  tomorrow.  Tomorrow's  self  will 
relate his present and future utilities  using his discount rate, not that of 
today's  self.  In particular, tomorrow's  self will  discount the following 
period  more heavily  than would  today's  self,  relative  to tomorrow's 
utility.  Since today's  self has already discounted  tomorrow's  marginal 
utility by 1B,  he will view the 1B  of tomorrow's  self as an extra discount. 
Hence  the Euler condition  for the decision  by today's  self  has to take 
into account what fraction of current saving is consumed tomorrow and 
how much is saved tomorrow for later periods.  Specifically,  the Euler 
equation becomes  equation  13 in the text: 
u'(C,)  =  E,tR[(  actX  t)) 
t  +  (1  A  X+  )  ] 
where  the first term in the square brackets corresponds  to the contri- 
bution (discounted by 138)  to expected  utility from consumption  tomor- 
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saving not spent next period. The second term is only discounted by 8, 
because tomorrow's  consumer will  do the ,  discounting  relative to his 
own marginal utility.  When ,1 is equal to 1, this equation reduces to the 
exponential  case described  above. 
The equation shows  that the discount factor relevant at time t varies 
between  8  and  836,  according  to how current saving  is expected  to be 
split between  increased consumption  tomorrow and in later periods.  A 
key point is that this division  depends crucially  on the existence  of the 
borrowing  constraint.  If  the  consumer  is  against  the  constraint  next 
period, any additional saving today will be consumed tomorrow and its 
utility should be discounted  by  38. This is more likely  for households 
with  low  accumulated  savings;  given  life-cycle  patterns of  income, 
borrowing  constraints  are more likely  among the young  and the very 
old.  By contrast,  if household  net worth is large and the probability of 
being  liquidity  constrained  in the near future is low,  the relevant dis- 
count factor will  be low. 
FOR  MORE  THAN  a  decade,  government  deficits  have  been  a  major 
economic  and political  issue  for many industrial and developing  coun- 
tries. In the United States, after years of political gridlock, the changing 
political  climate  and the good  fortune of  a rapidly growing  economy 
have resulted in a balanced budget for the first time since  1969.  In most 
European countries,  however,  substantial deficits continue.  Unemploy- 
ment remains high by historical  standards, burdening the transfer sys- 
tem and holding  down  revenues.  At the same time,  increasing  taxes, 
cutting social  programs, or scaling back large bureaucracies are politi- 
cally  charged initiatives  and difficult  to achieve.  In the third paper of 
this issue,  Alberto Alesina,  Roberto Perotti,  and Jose Tavares investi- 
gate the interactions  between  politics,  economics,  and fiscal reforms, 
focusing  particularly on their political  consequences  for governments. 
What  are the  elements  of  fiscal  reforms,  how  do  they  affect  the 
permanence of reform, and how do they relate to future macroeconomic 
performance? The  authors define  a fiscal  reform as a decrease  in the 
ratio of the primary deficit to GDP of more than 1.5 percentage points 
in a given year, and a "successful"  fiscal reform as one in which either 
the  average  deficit-to-GDP  ratio  during  the  three  years  following  a 
budget  adjustment  is  at least  2  percentage  points  lower  than in  the 
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to GDP is at least 5 percentage points lower than it was at the time of 
tightening.  Examining  nineteen countries of the Organisation for Eco- 
nomic Co-operation and Development  (OECD) from 1960 to 1995,  the 
authors confirm earlier findings that in general long-lasting  budget ad- 
justments  rely  primarily on  cuts  in categories  of  current spending- 
government  wages,  social  security,  and welfare.  By  contrast,  most 
adjustments that are short-lived  rely on cuts in government investment 
spending  or on revenue  increases.  Using  cyclically  corrected deficits, 
they  find sixty-nine  cases  of  fiscal  tightening,  nineteen  of  which  are 
successful  by their definitions.  The successful  tightenings  on average 
cut the deficit-to-GDP  ratio by about 3 percentage points,  and slightly 
more than half of the deficit reductions come from spending cuts of all 
types.  Unsuccessful  tightenings  average  about 2.5  percentage  points, 
and in these cases only one-quarter of the deficit reduction comes  from 
spending  cuts,  the  rest  from  revenue  increases.  The  most  dramatic 
difference between successful  and unsuccessful  adjustments is the com- 
position  of spending cuts.  In unsuccessful  adjustments, virtually all of 
the cuts are in public  investment,  whereas  in successful  adjustments, 
more than half of the cuts are in government  wages  and transfers. 
Beliefs  about the  economic  consequences  of  spending  cuts  or tax 
increases-both  those  of  governments  and those  of  the  populace  at 
large-presumably  help to shape attitudes about fiscal reforms.  What 
are the actual consequences  of  such  reforms,  and do they  align  with 
beliefs?  The authors examine  a wide  variety of macroeconomic  varia- 
bles before,  during, and after fiscal tightening.  These  include  changes 
in real GDP,  unemployment,  and nominal  and real interest rates-all 
relative to the same variables in other G7 countries; changes in private 
investment  and consumption;  and changes  in unit labor costs  and the 
exchange  rate. Although  they recognize  that many fiscal reforms have 
significant  effects  on  particular groups  of  individuals  or businesses, 
they do not explicitly  consider changes in the distribution of income or 
in indicators  of benefits  from social  programs.  Several  interesting  re- 
sults emerge.  On average,  successful  tightenings follow  periods of poor 
economic  performance,  with lower rates of relative output growth and 
higher relative unemployment  than in the periods preceding unsuccess- 
ful episodes.  Output growth tends to pick up after successful  tightenings 
and to  slow  after unsuccessful  ones,  though  the  difference  is  small. 
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enings.  The  authors also  find significant  differences  in  labor market 
outcomes.  Relative  unit labor costs  fall  before  and during successful 
tightenings,  but increase  during unsuccessful  ones.  However,  in the 
longer run labor costs rise much more after successful  than after unsuc- 
cessful  tightenings.  Both successful  and unsuccessful  adjustments are 
typically  accompanied  by a devaluation  of the currency. 
The  authors observe  that governments  and international  organiza- 
tions generally believe  that fiscal consolidations  contract the economy, 
despite an inconclusive  historical record. Their own results suggest that 
successful  adjustments are typically  preceded by fiscal stress-a  rela- 
tively  large  and increasing  ratio of  public  debt to GDP-which  may 
help to explain  why such reforms are associated  with increased output 
and consumption.  They  note that such  outcomes  are not inconsistent 
with theory.  The effects  of fiscal tightening  on demand may be offset 
by monetary policy.  In that case,  the primary effects  of cutting govern- 
ment expenditures are distributional; private expenditures will take their 
place.  If cuts  in government  expenditures  are accompanied  by lower 
taxes,  the reduced  tax  distortion  may  actually  increase  output.  Such 
efficiency  gains  are likely  to be  most  important for an economy  that 
starts with  high  taxes,  either  because  it  has  high  levels  of  primary 
government expenditure or because  it has accumulated a large govern- 
ment debt that must be serviced.  It is even  possible  for an increase  in 
taxes to result in an increase in consumption,  with government expen- 
ditures constant.  If raising taxes in the current period is  "tax  smooth- 
ing,"  because current taxes are lower than taxes expected in the future, 
redistributing the tax burden to the current period may provide an effi- 
ciency  and welfare  gain that raises current consumption. 
The authors identify the labor cost of firms as one of the main chan- 
nels through which  fiscal reform affects  the economy  in OECD coun- 
tries and point to two empirical regularities that suggest this mechanism 
at work.  The  first has to do  with  the direct impact of  fiscal  reforms: 
many successful  fiscal tightenings  reduce government expenditures on 
wages  and, as other studies have shown,  refrain from increasing  taxes 
on labor.  Second,  in terms of indirect influences,  unit labor costs  and 
the wage  share initially  fall during successful  adjustments,  leading the 
authors to suggest  that when government wage payments fall,  the bar- 
gaining  power  of  unions  is  reduced,  with  beneficial  results  for  the 
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after successful  adjustments  suggests  that any  such  effects  are short 
lived. 
The authors note that the inherent permanence of different types of 
spending cut varies.  A cut achieved  by postponing  the maintenance of 
public  capital  is  less  likely  to be  permanent than a change  in  social 
security or welfare  that reduces eligibility  or benefits.  Moreover,  cuts 
that are seen as permanent are more important to firms and households 
than temporary  cuts,  and  so  should  have  larger  impacts  on  private 
behavior.  Permanent cuts might stimulate private consumption  and in- 
vestment  demands,  both  by  reducing  interest  rates  and by  reducing 
expected  future tax liabilities.  Some budget reforms may have impacts 
through other channels.  The fact that welfare  cuts are particularly un- 
popular in Europe may actually increase the credibility of governments 
that undertake such initiatives. By signaling that a government is serious 
about fiscal  adjustment, such  cuts  may  result in  greater reductions in 
interest rates than would less difficult adjustments  of the same magnitude. 
The magnitude of interest rate reductions may also depend on other factors; 
for example,  such reductions may be especially large in high-debt coun- 
tries, where decisive fiscal reform reduces risk premiums. 
Turning to the relationship between the political composition  of cab- 
inets and deficit reduction policies,  the authors focus on two character- 
istics  of  governments:  the  composition  of  the  cabinet-whether  its 
members are from a single party or represent a coalition  of two or more 
national parties; and its ideological  alignment-right,  center,  or left, 
as given by an indicator widely  used in the political  science  literature. 
In their sample,  47 percent of country-years  are classified  as coalition 
governments,  and as to ideology,  54 percent are classified  as right,  12 
percent as center,  and 34 percent as left.  They find that the ideological 
orientation of government has little relation to the relative frequencies 
of  loose  and tight fiscal  episodes.  Overall,  roughly  20  percent of  the 
observations are classified as loose (increases in the deficit-to-GDP  ratio 
of  at least  1.5  percentage  points),  and 12 percent as tight (as defined 
above).  The probability that fiscal tightening  will  be successful  is also 
virtually  identical  for  left-  and right-wing  governments.  Perhaps the 
most interesting finding is that the probability of success  is much lower 
for centrist governments  than for regimes of either the right or the left, 
and lower for fragmented than for single  party cabinets. 
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ment of  undertaking fiscal  reform? The  authors examine  the issue  of 
survival using  four indicators: one that signals  every  change  in prime 
minister,  one that indicates  a change  in the ideological  orientation of 
the cabinet  (as defined above),  one that is positive  when either of the 
preceding  indicators is positive,  and one that signals  a termination of 
government  for any reason,  including  a termination that brings back 
the incumbent  government.  Out of  a total of  631  country-year  obser- 
vations,  there are 291 cabinet terminations,  164 changes of prime min- 
ister, and ninety-five changes in ideology.  Whereas in the United States 
changes  in government almost always result from general elections,  in 
many other countries changes occur without elections.  The correlations 
of these measures of political change with contemporaneous changes in 
deficits are weak. However,  terminations and changes in prime minister 
are positively  correlated with increases in the cyclically  corrected deficit 
and with the average change in the deficit over the government's  term 
in  office.  Hence  loose  policies  appear to  be  a political  liability,  but 
there is no suggestion  that tight fiscal policies  lead to electoral  defeat. 
One might  expect  that the probability  of  adverse  political  reaction to 
fiscal  tightening  would  be greater for large  adjustments,  and that the 
reaction might come after some delay.  Neither small nor large changes 
in deficits  appear to affect the likelihood  of a change in prime minister 
or ideology  contemporaneously.  Larger deficit reductions do appear to 
increase the probability of an ideological  change at the next termination, 
but curiously,  the largest effect seems to be for reductions of the deficit- 
to-GDP  ratio in the range of  1.5 to 2.5  percentage  points,  rather than 
for even bigger reductions. 
Politicians  believe  that spending  cuts,  especially  in safety  net pro- 
grams  and  social  security,  are particularly  unpopular.  But  in  most 
OECD countries it is virtually impossible  to achieve  significant spend- 
ing cuts without affecting  these components  of the budget.  In light of 
this,  it  is  interesting  that the  authors find that prime  ministers  have 
higher survival rates when they cut spending than when they increase 
taxes,  and that their chances  of survival  are improved by cutting gov- 
ernment wages.  Other results in the probit regressions  are weak,  but do 
suggest  some  anomalies.  Cuts in spending,  if  anything,  appear to in- 
crease the chances  of  a change  in cabinet ideology.  Likewise,  cuts in 
transfers increase  the probability  of  a change  in cabinet ideology  but 
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conclude  that,  overall,  these  results provide  scant evidence  that gov- 
ernments are punished  for reducing deficits  and,  if  anything,  suggest 
that permanently cutting government wages may actually enhance their 
prospects. 
The  authors expand  their  analysis  to  allow  political  change  to  be 
affected by economic  variables other than deficit changes,  by estimating 
probit equations with a measure of government change as a dependent 
variable and three macroeconomic  variables-growth  in GDP,  growth 
of  unemployment,  and the  inflation  rate-as  well  as  the  change  in 
various  deficit  measures  as explanatory  variables.  They  also  include 
three political explanatory variables: number of years in power, whether 
the  government  commands  a majority,  and whether  it  is  a coalition 
government.  Of the economic  variables, including deficit changes,  only 
higher inflation is significantly  associated  with an increase in the prob- 
ability of a change in government.  The political variables contain much 
more information and are almost always  statistically  significant.  Gov- 
ernment changes  are more  likely  for  coalition  governments  and the 
longer a government has been in power. Not surprisingly, governments 
that command majorities are less  likely  to change. 
Popularity polls  are another potential  source  of  information  about 
the political  costs  of  fiscal reforms.  The authors make use of  surveys 
from sixteen  countries to measure the year-to-year change in the pop- 
ularity of governments  for the period  1975-93.  While popularity may 
be imperfectly  connected  to political  survival,  for this exercise  it has 
the advantage of being observed more frequently than changes  in gov- 
ernment. Simple correlations of popularity and deficits indicate a polit- 
ical cost  from tightening,  but the importance of the deficit disappears 
once other variables are taken into account. In a regression of popularity 
on  macroeconomic  and political  variables  as  well  as  the  change  in 
deficit,  the deficit  is unimportant-indeed,  no single  variable appears 
to matter. 
Because  they do not deal directly  with the possible  endogeneity  of 
fiscal  reform,  the  authors pass  over  some  possible  reasons  for their 
results. They do not explicitly  examine the idea that politicians  do what 
is  acceptable  at  a  given  time;  or,  in  the  context  of  the  paper,  that 
cabinets choose  to implement politically  unpopular reforms when they 
are in  a strong political  position  and are unlikely  to  lose  office  as a 
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this is not a probable explanation.  First, deficit reductions do not appear 
to be concentrated early in the term of office,  when it might be thought 
relatively  safe  to  undertake a politically  costly  policy.  Second,  the 
average level  of government popularity at the time of deficit reductions 
is no greater than average popularity at other times. 
The authors believe  that their inability to find a relationship between 
changes in government and fiscal adjustments shows that voters actually 
dislike  fiscal profligacy  and do not punish governments  that attempt to 
end it.  But if fiscal  adjustments do not have high political  costs,  why 
then are they  so politically  charged and difficult  to implement?  They 
suggest two possibilities.  One is that governments are simply risk averse 
and reluctant to rock the boat. The other is that the political  influence 
of  some  constituencies  may  extend  well  beyond  their  weight  in  the 
vote.  For example,  in some countries unions can take political  actions 
with serious sociopolitical  consequences.  And in many countries union 
approval is sought before any fiscal action is undertaken. 
DURING  THE  PAST  decade,  aggregate personal saving  out of current 
income  has been low  by historical  standards in the United  States,  yet 
household  wealth has increased substantially.  The disproportionate in- 
crease in wealth relative to saving reflects the sharp rise in the value of 
equities and proprietorships owned by many households.  Understanding 
wealth  accumulation,  its relation to saving,  and its distribution within 
the population is important for many economic  issues,  such as project- 
ing national saving and aggregate consumer demand and appraising the 
adequacy of  retirement incomes  among age cohorts.  Traditional time 
series provide valuable information on wealth and its distribution across 
broad asset categories  and household types.  But they are inadequate for 
examining  the reactions of individual households  to changes in wealth, 
or the response  of individual  households'  wealth  and the composition 
of their asset holdings  to economic  forces.  In the first of two reports in 
this volume,  Erik Hurst, Ming Ching Luoh, and Frank Stafford present 
and analyze  data from the wealth  supplements  to the Panel  Study of 
Income  Dynamics.  By  tracking  individual  households,  these  wealth 
data provide direct information that addresses the issues  raised above. 
Data on wealth of individual households  are now available from the 
PSID  for  1984,  1989,  and 1994,  based on samples  of  about 7,000  in 
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on pension and social security wealth and are not reliable for measuring 
wealth at the very top of the distribution.  Subject to these limitations, 
the  PSID  supplements  provide  useful  information  on  the  changing 
wealth patterns of individual households over the survey years. Looking 
only at households  with the same family  head across survey years, the 
authors find considerable  wealth mobility  across the middle deciles  in 
the distribution and, not surprisingly,  much more persistence  at the top 
and bottom.  Because  individuals  can exit  the top and bottom in only 
one  direction,  some  greater persistence  is to be expected  under most 
views  of  transitions.  However,  the authors regard the actual facts  as 
showing  excessive  persistence.  The bottom  10 percent of families  had 
zero to negative  net worth in  1984,  and nearly half of  those  families 
were in the same position five years later. The top 10 percent of families 
had net worth over  $316,000  in  1984  (here  and throughout,  in  1996 
dollars)  and over  60  percent of  them were  in the top  10 percent  five 
years later. Nearer the middle of the distribution, persistence is roughly 
half as great as at these  extremes.  For the five-year  period starting in 
1989,  the  transition  probabilities  are similar.  Over the  entire period 
1984-94,  40 percent of the bottom tenth and over 50 percent of the top 
tenth remain in the same position,  while  persistence  in the middle  of 
the distribution is less  than 20 percent. 
The baby boom cohorts have been identified as a low-saving  group, 
which  helps  to  explain  the low  aggregate  saving  rate since  the mid- 
1980s.  Some  analysts have inferred that the boomers will  have inade- 
quate resources  at retirement,  while  others argue that as the boomers 
mature and enter their high-saving  years,  aggregate  saving  will  return 
to  earlier  levels.  Hurst,  Luoh,  and  Stafford  use  their  panel  data to 
examine  these issues.  They show that the senior boomers-the  cohort 
born between  1945 and 1954-had  median wealth of $63,446  in 1994, 
which is only  80 percent of the median wealth at the same point in the 
life  cycle  of  those  born a decade  earlier.  The junior boomers-those 
born between  1955 and 1964-were  still  further behind,  with median 
wealth in 1994 only 67 percent as large as the median for senior boomers 
ten years earlier. Thus despite the considerable increases in asset values 
over these  years,  household  wealth  accumulation  among boomers  has 
not kept pace  with  accumulation  of  earlier cohorts  at the same  ages. 
Transition probabilities  for the senior boomers  also exhibit  more mo- 
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a relatively  young cohort.  However,  they do show many people  stuck 
near the  bottom  of  the  distribution,  with  little  or no  wealth.  Of  the 
bottom tenth in  1984,  with  zero or negative  wealth,  33  percent were 
still  in  the  bottom  tenth ten  years  later,  and 64  percent  were  in the 
lowest  fifth,  with  less  than $10,000  of  wealth.  Although  these  data 
suggest that a substantial number of boomers will enter retirement with 
little or no household  wealth,  the authors note that the growing  impor- 
tance of pensions may improve the position of some of these households 
at retirement. 
Breaking net wealth into various asset classes  and debt, the authors 
report that the proportion of  households  using  noncollaterized  debt- 
primarily, credit card debt-leveled  off at around 50 percent after 1989; 
for those using it, the mean value of such debt rose sharply to $12,525 
in  1994.  The proportion of  households  with transaction accounts  de- 
clined modestly  among all families,  while the proportion owning stocks 
rose from 25  percent in  1984 to 35 percent in  1994.  For both assets, 
ownership  among  African  American  families  is  well  below  that  of 
whites:  only 45 percent of African American families  owned bank ac- 
counts  and  14 percent owned  stocks  in  1994.  Probit analysis  reveals 
that this substantial difference  in stock ownership is not fully explained 
by income,  age distribution,  or other life-cycle  variables. 
Turning to regressions  explaining  wealth holdings,  the authors find 
that wealth  is positively  related to permanent income  (total family  in- 
come  over  1987-91),  age,  education,  and being  married.  They  also 
find that  after  accounting  for  the  income  and demographic  factors, 
African Americans held on average $27,408  less  wealth than others in 
the  population  in  1994.  To  explore  the  effect  of  the  highest  wealth 
holders on these results, the authors also estimate regressions that min- 
imize the sum of absolute departures from the median,  and thus reduce 
the  influence  of  wealth  outliers.  In these  regressions,  the net wealth 
difference  between  African Americans  and others is estimated  at only 
$2,815  in  1994 and is insignificant.  The authors infer that a good part 
of  the  average  wealth  differences  that income  and education  cannot 
account for may be due to the fact that relatively  few African American 
families  have extremely  high levels  of wealth. 
In  stylized  life-cycle  models,  wealth  accumulation  is  the  conse- 
quence of smoothing  consumption  and is systematically  related to sav- 
ing  at different  life  stages  and predictable  rates of  return. In reality, William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xxxiii 
saving behavior is highly  heterogenous  across households  at all stages 
of  the life  cycle,  and returns vary unpredictably  both over  time  and 
with each household's  choice  of assets.  The authors report that while 
rates of active saving (the change in wealth less capital gains) declined 
between  their first and second  five-year  sample  period,  wealth  accu- 
mulation  relative  to  income-or  realized  saving  rates-were  un- 
changed.  Using  regressions  to estimate the determinants of wealth ac- 
cumulation over 1989-94,  they find that wealth holdings  at the start of 
the period are significant  but account for less  than 1 percent a year of 
growth in wealth.  Dividing  wealth  into  major assert categories,  they 
find that holdings of stock or private business add substantially to wealth 
accumulation,  with  coefficients  seven  or eight  times  as  large  as  the 
coefficient  on total wealth,  while home equity is a drag over the period. 
Because  it is likely that the first two asset classes  had surprisingly large 
capital gains, these results suggest target wealth is not a dominant factor 
in saving  decisions;  it does  not appear that asset appreciation is offset 
by  lower  active  saving.  However,  other  results  do  not  support this 
finding. 
When they  take flows  into account,  the authors find large positive 
correlations between  wealth accumulation  and contemporaneous  flows 
into both stock and private business,  and received  inheritances.  When 
active  saving  and capital  gains  over the period  1984-89  are added to 
the  regressions  explaining  wealth  accumulation  over  1989-94,  they 
have modest but significant  negative  signs.  The coefficient  on capital 
gains  could  reflect target saving  with unexpectedly  large gains  in the 
previous  period.  The coefficient  on active  saving  is more of a puzzle, 
since  active  saving  is deliberate,  and it is usually thought that there is 
persistence to saving behavior. Although these results leave many ambi- 
guities, the authors  regard their analysis as a preliminary step in exploiting 
a new source of information about household saving behavior. 
I N  M O S T  U . s . industries, the standard work week has been forty hours 
since  1940 and there has been little discussion  of changing it. By con- 
trast, in some European nations, where the standard work week reached 
around forty hours only much more recently,  there has been consider- 
able interest in reducing it further. Historically,  much of the decline  in 
hours worked  per year has come  about through longer  vacations  and 
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greater leisure  as  incomes  grew.  Currently,  a  shorter work  week  is 
being  promoted as a way to share work and increase  employment.  In 
the  second  report of  this  volume,  Jennifer Hunt reviews  these  broad 
developments  and reports on her own  analysis  of the effects  of  short- 
ening the work week,  using panel data from German workers. 
Hunt shows  that the standard work year for manufacturing workers 
ranges widely  across nineteen  advanced economies.  Of these,  in 1995 
Germany had the lowest  average work year,  18 percent below  Japan's, 
which  was  highest,  and  16 percent  below  that of  the  United  States. 
Over  the previous  decade,  the  work year had declined  noticeably  in 
about half of the countries.  Variations  in the standard work week  are 
smaller  than  in  the  work  year,  with  Germany's  the  lowest,  at 36.4 
hours,  and  seven  countries  bunched  at forty  hours.  Given  political 
commitments  to reduce the standard work week to thirty-five hours in 
Italy and France and union pressures to reduce it further in Germany, 
the variation across countries could widen in coming  years. 
Although the popular conception  is that shortening the standard work 
week  would  increase employment  by sharing a fixed amount of work, 
Hunt notes  that theory gives  ambiguous  predictions  about its effects. 
Firms constrained to operate at standard hours higher than their optimal 
hours per worker will  increase employment  if the standard work week 
is  reduced  and hourly  wages  are unchanged.  By  contrast,  firms that 
initially  choose  to  pay  some  overtime  and operate  with  actual hours 
above the standard will find that the marginal cost of a worker has risen, 
because more hours are charged at overtime,  although the marginal cost 
of  an employee  working  an extra hour has not changed.  These  firms 
have  an incentive  to reduce employment  and raise average hours per 
employee.  Any increase in the hourly wage to sustain weekly pay would 
have negative effects  on employment.  From these and other considera- 
tions,  including possible effects on labor supply, it is clear that the con- 
sequences of reducing standard  hours must be examined empirically. 
Hunt reports that time-series  studies have not pinned down the effects 
of standard hours reductions on either wages  or employment.  Her own 
earlier work exploiting  cross-section  variation in standard hours reduc- 
tions in Germany finds that reductions in standard hours translate almost 
one for one into reductions in actual hours and result in approximately 
offsetting  increases in hourly wages.  Thus the weekly wages of workers 
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the weekly  wages of workers in other industries.  Employment declined 
in the industries where standard hours were reduced,  though the mag- 
nitude  of  the  employment  effect  was  not  estimated  with  precision. 
Expanding on these results in the present paper, she finds that reductions 
in the standard hours of primary workers have no significant  effect  on 
the probability  that a spouse  will  be employed,  but lead  to a modest 
reduction in the hours worked by employed  spouses.  This could reflect 
either generalized  union pressure or a complementarity  in leisure  be- 
tween  spouses. 
Some  recent attempts to explain  reductions  in standard hours have 
stressed  the  gap between  actual hours and desired  hours of  workers. 
Using  information from the German Socio-Economic  Panel for the pe- 
riod 1985-94,  Hunt examines  how this gap has changed in response to 
reductions in standard hours. These  data enable her to separate manu- 
facturing from services  and, within these two industry classes,  produc- 
tion workers from salaried workers.  Between  1985  and 1994,  in each 
of the four groups, the averages of both standard hours and actual hours 
declined,  as did the gap between  average actual and desired hours and 
the absolute  value  of  the gap.  Using  panel regressions  that allow  for 
individual fixed effects  and include year, firm size,  and industry dum- 
mies,  Hunt estimates  the effect  of  changing  standard hours on actual 
and desired hours of individual workers. The results for all four worker 
groups  are broadly  similar:  actual hours fell  almost  in proportion to 
standard hours,  while  desired hours fell  by substantially  less.  Neither 
the gap between  actual and desired hours nor the absolute value of this 
gap was closed,  although they were narrowed. 
Together with Hunt's other reported results from the German panel 
data, these  results suggest  that incumbent workers benefited  from the 
standard hours reductions  negotiated  by unions.  Actual hours fell  but 
incomes  were maintained,  spousal  hours moved  in the same direction 
as the hours of  primary workers,  and actual hours moved  somewhat 
closer  to  desired  hours.  However,  there  is  neither  evidence  nor a 
presumption  of  a work-sharing  effect  between  incumbents  and the 
unemployed. 